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EU foreign ministers held a meeting on 15 August over the issue of providing military support to Kurdish
forces operating in Iraq. Marianna Charountaki writes on the role of Turkey in the conflict, which
not only shares a border with Iraq and Syria, but also has a large Kurdish population. She notes that
relations between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq have improved over
recent years and that the current conflict underlines the potential benefits for Turkey in accepting a
stable Kurdistan.
The last few months has seen the rapid emergence of a radical religious group, the Islamic State
(IS), and its achievement of an unexpected and far-reaching victory over a geographically crucial
area covered by key Middle Eastern states, Iraq and Syria. This incursion, regionally and internationally supported,
has also affected the oil rich Kurdistan Region whose stability and security had lasted since the aftermath of the Iraqi
War in 2003 and the region’s subsequent further empowerment.
The Kurdistan Region’s stability is not only a domestic
issue but also an international and regional necessity
given the economic and political interests that are now
at stake in the region. This can be noted in Barack
Obama’s recent statement that the Kurdish region “is
functional in the way we would like to see [therefore] we
do think to make sure that the space is protected”. In
addition, a Middle East in turmoil is in need of an oasis
of security and stability as an asset for the much desired
preservation of the ‘regional balance of power’.
This is the case for the traditional forces of power,
whose control over the region is now being challenged.
The forces presenting this challenge wish to restructure
the regional balance of power and reshape existing
alliances according to the new realities emerging from
the current conflict, which is being shaped along ethnic
and sectarian lines, including the Sunni-Shiite divide.
This is also a reflection of the regional powers’
reactionary policies toward the role of external powers in Middle East politics. Under these conditions, regional
powers attempt to maximise their influence and mediation in regional politics, and the Kurdistan Region is currently
a suitable ground to exert those interests.
In view of the desperate regional and international efforts for a unified Iraq, territorially and politically, the Kurdistan
Regional Government at the moment appears to the regional and international players as the only bridge to achieve
the existence of a Federal Iraq as a united entity. Within this context, the US President’s declarations of support can
be understood. The same frame allows us to view Turkey’s efforts for mediation vis-à-vis Ankara’s calls to the US
administration to lift obstacles preventing the sale of Kurdish oil, providing another input to the oil market.
The Kurdistan Region is thus seen not only as an economic partner, but also as a political one: as a facilitator
through its mediating role and a capable actor in keeping Iraq united, as well as maintaining the regional equilibrium
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rather than disturbing it. Therefore, the US on the one hand and France – which is historically sensitive to the
Kurdish cause – on the other, eventually decided to support the Kurdistan Region against the expansion of IS and its
supporters, thus instigating the urgent meeting of the EU foreign affairs council on Iraq on 15 August.
Though the EU has given the green light to arm Kurdish forces due to the humanitarian crisis that has broken out in
Iraq, the EU is nevertheless not directly involved and none of its members, with the exception of France, has armed
the Kurds so far. This is potentially a reflection of the fact that the EU is dealing with the Kurds through an Iraqi
framework: the EU consists of state entities and thus prioritises Iraq’s territorial integrity, recognizing collective rather
than individual rights.
Within the same context Brussels’ hesitance to recognise the Kurdistan Regional Government as a de jure state
may also be explained as a balancing act between the excessive provision of aid andtheir concern that “to support
the Kurds militarily could hasten a Kurdish breakaway and a Kurdish state”. Human rights issues are only one factor;
protecting Kurdish natural resources and preventing their exploitation are also key issues in the EU’s condemnation
of IS atrocities.
As far as Ankara is concerned, the strengthening of Turkish-Kurdish relations has been a reality since 2008.
However, the current regional turmoil has now made Turkey aware, more so than ever before, of the benefit to
themselves in accepting a stable Kurdistan. While Turkey would indeed prefer that regional issues and especially
the Kurdish issue go through Ankara – as in the oil exports case – Turkey’s aspiration to become a considerable
regional power has made clear the need for a good neighbourhood policy, especially with the Kurds.
On the same basis, there is a ‘vicious (or potentially virtuous) triangle’ between Turkey’s Europeanisation process,
the Kurdish Issue, and democratisation. As I have previously argued, this makes clear that Turkey’s strategic
relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government are informed by the need for co-operation – good relations can
only have a positive impact on Turkey’s peace process and thus on the resolution of its own Kurdish issue.
Within these parameters, Turkish involvement in the conflict between the Kurdish forces in Iraq and IS militants
might hurt Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party politically, in view of the recent presidential
elections on 10 August. On the other hand it would eliminate any possibility of Kurdish forces acting to put pressure
on (Turkish held) Western Kurdistan, especially if anything were to go wrong with Turkey’s peace process.
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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